Control coverage
Of the 27 measures described here, 10 are delivered, 12 are partial, 3 are open and 2 are deferred. These counts describe measures, not a percentage of threats eliminated.
Each M identifier names a control and links it to the threats it addresses.
Reading the status
Section titled “Reading the status”- Delivered: the control or documented operator procedure exists for the current workflow. This does not imply complete platform acceptance.
- Partial: useful protection exists, but part of the measure or its required validation is missing.
- Open: the proposed control is absent.
- Deferred: a deliberate extension outside the current workflow.
Check the acceptance requirements on your own setup. The implementation still has the validation gaps listed below.
Delivered measures
Section titled “Delivered measures”| ID | Control and current coverage | Threats | Limit |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | Run access is limited to the provider profile and selected registries. --no-registry removes package access. |
T12 T24 | Allowed destinations can still receive data. |
| M2 | One provider profile per VM, stored on the host and checked at entry. | T12 T27 | One provider can use multiple hosts and route to multiple models. |
| M8 | Operator guidance treats exports as untrusted and requires human triage before acting or sharing. | T05 T30 T31 | This is a human procedure, not output sanitisation. |
| M9 | repro-create starts a separate VM from the clean template, applies network denies and refuses model keys. |
T19 | Optional: the exercises run tests in the review VM. A reproducer cannot install a target’s dependencies, so tests that need packages run in the review VM. DNS validation remains incomplete (M5). |
| M14 | skills imports operator-selected packs, filters files and records commit, local edits and hashes. URL fetches isolate Git configuration. Archive uploads use binary stdin with a timeout and attempt staging cleanup on failure. |
T24 T33 | Pin and review the content. Moving refs, writable guest skills and unbounded host fetch size remain limits. |
| M20 | Entry and key-transfer guards check VM identity, mounts, ports, policy, credentials and management access; inspection errors refuse entry. | T01 T07 | Checks run at entry. Trusted host changes during a session are not continuously monitored. |
| M22 | Host adapters handle import paths, file modes, locking and script line endings across macOS, Linux and Windows. | T01 T04 T28 | The fallback file reader has a documented race window; some Windows actions require a desktop session. |
| M24 | Bootstrap requires HTTPS Ubuntu mirrors before package updates and grants mirror access on port 443. | T34 | This does not pin package contents or replace signature checks. |
| M25 | The wrapper’s own sbx calls run without prompts: removals pass --force, creation passes --skills off, and setup refuses an sbx older than v0.45.0, the release these flags were checked against. |
T01 T11 | A later sbx release can rename a flag again; the floor is a minimum, not a pin. Checked with one fresh create on macOS; the full 0.45.0 acceptance matrix is still to be run. |
| M26 | Sandbox-scoped denies cover the private, loopback, link-local, carrier-grade NAT, multicast and reserved ranges of both address families; the earlier catch-all address denies are gone. Allowed hostnames that resolve to public addresses pass. The policy lock checks that sampled private addresses hit a sandbox rule. | T11 T15 T16 | Public addresses reached by number fall to sbx’s default deny, which raises an approval request an operator can grant. The lock-time check evaluates literal addresses, not what a hostname resolves to. sbx applies the range denies to a hostname’s resolved address when it dials, so a host service may see the connection attempt. On sbx before 0.49.1 an allowed hostname skips the CIDR rules. |
Partial measures
Section titled “Partial measures”| ID | What exists | What remains | Threats |
|---|---|---|---|
| M3 | Filtered import of Git-tracked files, a host-side file list with hashes, and archive export without extraction on the host. Public GitHub imports isolate host Git configuration and record the resolved commit before transferring filtered files. Tracked symlinks are never followed on the host: a link whose index target resolves to an imported file or directory inside the repository is recreated in the guest; any other link is skipped and listed. | Export does not strip terminal controls or validate content. Import exclusions do not find secrets embedded in source. Host Git downloads have no size cap. Synthetic target configuration is an operator task. Link targets come from the Git index, so an unstaged change to a link is not imported. | T04 T05 T20a T22 |
| M4 | Creation publishes no ports; entry rejects published ports. | Complete host/LAN listener checks on each supported setup, including running targets. | T03 T20b |
| M5 | DNS filtering through the sandbox network policy. | Validate UDP/TCP, alternate resolvers, containers and upstream queries, including reproducer VMs. | T13 |
| M7 | External policy logs, import/skill manifests and manual report export. | Saved logs and reports linked to the same run. logs prints only the latest 30 entries; harness transcripts remain workload-writable. |
T10 |
| M11 | Root-owned OpenCode settings, settings that disable project configuration, and defaults for each supported harness. | Minimum security settings that the workload cannot disable in any supported harness. The workload can unset environment variables and modify its own settings. | T22 |
| M13 | A clean template saved before code or credentials enter; reset recreates the VM; setup refuses to rerun on an already configured guest. |
Fresh state is not automatic at run entry. import --replace keeps tools, harness state, output and credentials. |
T23 T29 |
| M16 | Selected harness/Node versions, disabled routine updates, bootstrap version record and current versions shown by verify. |
Installer checksums, image digests, remaining package pins and protection against workload tool changes. | T23 T28 |
| M19 | Host-name denies and the range denies of M26; on sbx 0.49.1 and later they apply to the address an allowed hostname resolves to. | Tests for resolution changes during a session and for names with several addresses; a check at lock time that the provider host still resolves to a public address. | T16 |
| M21 | Entry assertions, policy-decision checks and operator network-check instructions. | A repeatable full network test suite with correlated denial evidence. verify does not perform that suite. |
T11 T13 T16 T18 |
| M23 | One selected harness per VM, provider-specific defaults and known credential-store cleanup. The stored API key is removed by unkey, stop, reset and destroy, whether or not the VM runs. |
Harness login stores are cleaned only from a running VM, and cleanup errors are ignored. Codex API-key use and provider-side seat revocation still need validation. | T12 T22 T25 T28 |
| M27 | Bootstrap removes apt sources the base image ships for hosts it does not use, names each removed file, and stops by file name when a source for an unknown host remains, all before its first package update. create records the image digest it started from in the VM’s state. |
A digest pin for the base image and a procedure to refresh it. sbx couples its releases to the template image, so a pin would need refreshing with each sbx release and checking per architecture. The recorded digest is not shown by verify. |
T28 T35 |
| M17 | API keys stay on the host: key stores the key in sbx’s credential store scoped to the VM, the VM’s kit declares the key variable as proxy-managed, the workload holds a placeholder, and sbx’s proxy adds the real value to requests to the provider host. unkey, stop, reset and destroy remove the stored key. create and reset refuse while sbx’s bindings file binds another VM’s appsec- service; destroy removes the VM’s own binding unless another VM uses it. |
The proxy adds the key to every request to that host, so any guest process can still use it, and no API method is restricted. The stored key rests in the host credential store until removed. Injection needs the forward proxy. Seat logins still write tokens to the guest disk. Harness runs against the placeholder are not yet recorded on every provider. sbx attaches every binding in that file to each new VM and reads removals only after a daemon restart: keyed VMs of different providers cannot run side by side, and a binding removed without a restart is caught by the entry guard only after creation. | T24 T25 |
Open and deferred measures
Section titled “Open and deferred measures”| ID | Status | Missing control | Threats |
|---|---|---|---|
| M6 | Open | Guest patch/refresh policy with an enforced maximum baseline age. Bootstrap installs packages but does not perform a full upgrade. | T07 |
| M12 | Open | Tools installed where the workload cannot modify them. Node and harness binaries currently live under its home. | T23 |
| M15 | Open | A deadline enforced from the host, including child processes and reproducer VMs. Prompt budgets and a guest timeout command do not provide this boundary. |
T26 |
| M10 | Deferred | TLS inspection, if the use case requires finer control of allowed traffic. | T14 |
| M18 | Deferred | A supported staging-target action with narrow grants, logging, credentials, reset and ownership checks. | T16 T21 |
Implementation and operating instructions
Section titled “Implementation and operating instructions”| Controls | Source and operating instructions |
|---|---|
| Provider and network policy: M1/M2/M5/M19/M21/M26 | Policy compiler, lifecycle; provider guide. |
| Entry checks and sbx CLI contract: M4/M20/M25 | sbx adapter; command reference. |
| Transfer and skills: M3/M8/M14/M22 | Transfer, GitHub fetch, host adapter; import/export, skills. |
| Guest setup: M6/M11/M12/M16/M23/M24/M27 | Bootstrap; provider guide. |
| Credentials: M17/M23 | Credentials, providers; provider guide, VM lifetime. |
| Evidence and lifetime: M7/M9/M13/M15 | Lifecycle; VM lifetime, run report. |
Mapping the six no-regret measures
Section titled “Mapping the six no-regret measures”The operator baseline groups the controls into six practices. This table preserves their links to the detailed model.
| Practice | Threats | Acceptance | Current implementation and limit |
|---|---|---|---|
| Isolated runner | T01 T02 T23 T29 | R1 R7 | VM, mount guards, clean template and explicit reset; VM escape remains accepted. |
| No unrelated credentials in reach | T04 T07 T08 T09 T22 T25 | R4 R5 | Filtered import, unprivileged entry and no host identity forwarding; the API key stays on the host and the guest holds a placeholder, but any guest process can still use it. |
| Egress denied by default | T11 T12 T13 T14 T15 T16 T17 T18 T21 T27 | R2 R3 | Provider/registry policy, private-range denies and drift checks; DNS filtering remains incomplete. |
| Short-lived, unshared credentials | T25 T26 | R4 R7 | Dedicated credential or login and explicit unkey; the stored key stays until unkey, stop, reset or destroy, login stores survive idle stops and are cleaned only from a running VM, and revocation is separate. |
| Budget first | T26 | R7 | Provider cap where available and operator threshold; no host deadline. |
| Kill switch | T26 T32 | R7 | Wrapper stop includes recorded reproducers; revoke credentials and dispose of retained data separately. |